I give (I) conceptual clarifications relevant for our argumentation: facts versus
we inquiring, whether ethical limits should be imposed on science from outside, i.e. ethical limits to science. The short answer is: both. We will see that, on the one hand, the process itself of conducting science often raises ethical questions, and that the application of results of science, on the other, may pose ethical problems. The typical addressee of the internal ethical problems is the scientist him-or herself, while the typical addressee of the consequential problems is the society or the lawgiving bodies, respectively. On the basis of this distinction the title of the paper would better read as: "Ethical Limits of and to Science".
Ethics seems to be a topic philosophers, and sometimes also theologians, deal with in a professional way. We might ask, why doesn't one leave to the scientists and doctors themselves the reasoned answer to ethical questions that arise in their respective disciplines? The answer that scientists and physicians often find difficult to accept is that scientific or medical competence is categorically different from ethical competence. Scientific competence relates to the facts of the world and delivers descriptive results, while ethical competence relates to norms and values and delivers evaluative and normative results. In short, science tells us what there is, while ethics tells us, what we should do, or which things we should value. This doesn't exclude that a scientist or doctor may give valuable ethical guidelines. But in doing this they do not make use of their scientific or therapeutic but rather of their philosophical competence. Such competence, however, often is badly missing. The degree of confidence of scientists and doctors in their ethical arguments is often negatively proportional to their quality. This we find, of course, also in philosophy and elsewhere, and not only when it comes to the ethics of science.
In standard philosophical parlance, there is an important difference between "ethics" and "morals". "Morals" relate to actually existing rules or norms of conduct of persons or groups. It does not matter whether those rules are "good" or "bad". Thus, one speaks, for example, of the morals of the Mafia, or of the investment banking elite of bank X, and at the same time of the morals of the Catholic Church, or rural Lutheran communities in Northern Finland. What these examples have in common and what distinguishes them from "ethics" is their lack of universal justification. Sure, the moral rules of the Catholic Church are intended to further the common good, different from those of the Mafia or the banks. But their justification has to finally rely on the existence of God and on the authoritative interpretation of His word by the Church, both of which cannot claim universal assent.
It is the philosophical sub-discipline ethics that attempts the justification of moral norms in a universalized form. "Universalization" means: taking recourse to principles and arguments to which supposedly everybody could give assent, provided that one lives with the intention to morally respect other people. Kant has called this intention "the good will" (der gute Wille). There is a large variety of attempts to systematize ethics: Kantian ethics is based on the "categorical imperative". One of its formulations is: "act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law without contradiction". 1 So called consequential ethics concentrate on the overall consequences of our actions and are based on some principle of utilitarianism, e.g. Jeremy Bentham's classical definition:
"By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever according to the tendency it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question: or, what is the same thing in other words to promote or to oppose that happiness.". 2
These first two really universalizing approaches to ethics have been refined and reformulated in the course of the more than 200 years of their existence. They are at the same time the most explicit examples of ethical universalization. Although others, less explicit ones, exist, like the recourse to Aristotelian virtue ethics, and all sorts of mixed systems, we could, nonetheless, say: ethical norms are universalistically justified moral norms.
As to ethical norms there is a striking similarity to the descriptive realm, which is characteristic of science. As is universally accepted these days, all scientific statements are as a matter of principle hypothetical, even the optimally justified and reliable ones. There is, on principle, no absolute or infallible knowledge in the realm of the factual, even if we are convinced that many scientific statements, laws of nature etc. hold firmly without any prospect of ever changing. What applies to the descriptive realm applies also to the normative. Ethical justification is based on principles, which we cannot "prove" in a definite sense -as little as we can "prove" the laws of nature. This is already clear from the fact that there exist various such principles, whose application may lead to diverging moral norms. Apart from that, the application of ethical principles and moral norms is not an algorithmic procedure that leads to the same results with everybody. Rather, it rests on judgment, and judging has to take into account both the principles and the circumstances of their application. The result is what one might call moral pluralism. Moral pluralism is the form of morals in secular democratic states, where no institution can claim to be in the possession of absolute truths, be it scientific truths, be it moral truths.
Moral pluralism, however, does not mean moral relativism, because -despite their differences -all moral principles have one thing in common: their ratio essendi is the insight that other beings have moral rights towards us. Every universal ethical conception can be regarded as an attempt at developing the norms, which are included in the moral respect that we owe to other beings. This common ground in my view unites different ethical approaches more than their differences separate them.
Another distinction is of great importance in our context: the difference between ethics and law. 3 Sure, both fields overlap: There are many laws that have an ethical foundation. Think, for example, of those sections of the penal code that forbid murder, fraud, pedophiliac actions and the like. Such sections are the forensic form of moral norms plus the threat of punishment for their violation. But there are moral norms as the imperative not to lie or imperatives in the wide field of partnership that -in general -are not at the same time legal norms. Another difference between moral norms and legal norms relates to conviction. Legal norms require simply a certain behavior. It is irrelevant, whether one takes a legal norm to be reasonable or nonsense as long as one behaves according to that norm. Take e.g. speed limits. It does not matter whether you deem speed limits as severe restriction of your freedom, as long as you keep within the speed limit. It is hardly imaginable, however, that somebody speaks the truth even to his/her disadvantage, but at the same time reckons the moral norm "you shall no lie!" to be mistaken.
Most important in the context of morals and law is the question, which moral norms should be protected by law. As to be expected, there exist different answers to this question. I very much support the enlightenment conception, which includes that religion is a private affair, and that, accordingly, religion and state should be kept separate from each other. 4 This includes that norms based on religious belief do not have any privilege in the political discussion about legal sanctions of moral norms.
Furthermore, I support the liberal conception that the democratic state should interfere with the private concerns of citizens as little as possible and as much as necessary. This leads to the answer that moral norms need legal sanctioning only if they express a common good whose implementation is vital for the functioning of society.
II. Moral Limits Imposed on Science
After this long conceptual overture we have, finally, properly arrived at our topic. Let us first have a look at moral limits that are imposed on science from outside, i.e. by law. Putting morally justified legal limits to science means, first of all, restricting academic freedom. Probably in all European countries academic freedom is guaranteed either by law or by the constitution. The German Constitution of 1949 (Grundgesetz) in its first part on the fundamental rights of the citizens succinctly states: 4 In WOLTERS, G., "Aufklärung und Religion -damals und heute", in BUSER P., DEBRU C. y MEYER P. Note that any restriction in the case of PGD does not relate to scientific research but rather to its application. Similar questions arise in other fields. Take atomic research as it is applied by the atomic industry in order to construct atomic power plants. Again, atomic research itself is "innocuous", its application is not. To mention just one point: atomic waste. Plutonium-239 that is generated in reactors has a half life of 24,000 years. Note that we can identify the first Egyptian cultures some 6,000 years ago. Could they properly communicate with us, as we now should be able to communicate with cultures several times farther ahead of us, and tell them how they have to treat nuclear waste? I doubt this very much. Apart from this there is the moral problem of future generations that will live much closer to us: they might have to pay the price for our way of life.
III. Moral Limits Set by Scientists Themselves
In this section I would like to talk about moral limits that are imposed on science not from outside but, rather, set by researchers themselves. This may occur on the individual as well as on the institutional level. Somebody might opt out from a certain type weapon related research, e.g. chemical weapons, because he/she objects to the use of such weapons for moral reasons. Others might leave military research altogether because for them wars in general are morally unjustified. There are possibly more such individual pacifist options than we might hear of in the media.
An interesting historical example is the German Uranprojekt, which from 1939 on tried to lay the scientific foundations for building an atomic reactor and a bomb.
Particularly physicists Werner Heisenberg and Otto Hahn seem to have had great hesitations to build the bomb for the Nazi government. This results from intercepted conversations of the German scientists in Farm Hall (England), where they had been detained after the war by the British secret service. 8 Particularly Hahn, who in 1938 had detected nuclear fission in 1938, felt personally co-responsible for the death of more than 90,000 people in Hiroshima, where the first (American) atomic bomb was dropped.
A more recent example of a research moratorium on an institutional level are the guidelines that were worked out at a conference on recombinant DNA in Asilomar (California) in 1975. This had to do with the potential danger of creating deadly monsters by genetically modifying existing ones. The guidelines forbade, in fact, certain types of potentially dangerous experiments. The Asilomar conference and its guidelines turned out to be a milestone in the development of interaction between biological science and society. Scientists became more and more aware that they owe responsibility for their work to the society that finances it. Financing leads us to another problem in the context of ethical limits of research.
I would like to mention here only one point that is related to the problem that much research is not financed by the state or public institutions but by private companies. Private companies do not act for philanthropic reasons. They would like to see a quick return for the money they invest. One could say, of course, there is no problem: science delivers objective results. Therefore, it is of no importance who finances research. This is, unfortunately, not so. Objectivity is, in fact, one of the ideals of science. It is an ideal, though, that is often realized only in a rather approximate way. Although this study refrains from establishing a causal connection, everything suggests that the interests of the sponsors, perhaps without the conscious intention of the researchers, somehow diffused into the result of research.
There are more recent examples that seem to be less innocent. I rather think that they point into the direction of corruption and/or ideology. In this context Naomi Oreskes' and Eric Conway's book Merchants of Doubt is of utmost importance. 12 Here is a quote from the website of the book: "The U.S. scientific community has long led the world in research on public health, environmental science, and other issues affecting the quality of life. 
IV. Ethical Limits of Science -Largely Ignored by Economists
Commencing in 2007, Western countries have been experiencing an enormous economic crisis, Spain being one of those hit hardest. The crisis began as a crisis of financial markets triggered by the U.S. real estate bubble, the bankruptcy of the Lehman Bank, the almost meltdown of the AIG insurance giant, and similar disasters. 13 Quickly, real economy was affected with devastating social consequences.
There exists a "Financial Crisis Inquiry Report" of 662 pages that the "National
Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United
States" 14 presented to the US government in January 2011. Its "Conclusions" about the causes of the crisis, which has been judged as "avoidable", are as follows: The "Conclusions" conclude: "There is still much to learn, much to investigate, and much to fix. This is our collective responsibility. It falls to us to make different choices if we want different results." 15 What is fascinating about this report is that nobody in the US government seems to be interested in a possible scientific background of the glamorous failure of economic policy, i.e. a possible background in mainstream economic theory, otherwise called "neoclassical economics". 16 There are, however, highly respected economists, who see things differently.
Joseph E. Stiglitz writes:
"As we peel back the layers of >what went wrong<, we cannot escape looking at the economics profession. Of course, not all economists joined in the jubilation of free market economics; not all were disciples of Milton Friedman. A surprisingly large fraction, though, leaned in that direction.
Not only was their advice flawed; they failed in their basis tasks of prediction and forecasting. […] It was not an accident that those who advocated the rules that led to the calamity were so blinded by their faith in free markets that they couldn't see the problems it was creating.
Economics had moved -more than economists would like to think -from 15 Although the word "fraud" occurs in the report "no fewer than 157 times", interestingly, not one high level executive has been prosecuted so far. Cf. RAKOFF, J. S., "The Financial Crisis: Why have no High-Level Executives Been Prosecuted?", The New York Review of Books, v. 61, n. 1 , 2014. -The author, a United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York -Wall Street is situated there -gives fascinating answers to the title question. Among them is a juridical parallel for the political-economic "too big to fail": too big to jail. -The situation in Europe is certainly not very different. 16 In this scientific context I avoid the word "neoliberalism" that has become a poorly defined "academic catchphrase" and a political combat term. On the history of "neoliberalism" cf. BOAS, T. C, GANS-MORSE, J., "Neoliberalism: From New Liberal Philosophy to Anti-Liberal Slogan," Studies in Comparative International Development, v. 44, (2009) including above all economics, to become a science like physics: fully mathematized and reliable like mechanics, electromagnetism or quantum theory. This desire might be fueled in Anglo-Saxon countries by the linguistic peculiarity that "science" normally only relates to what elsewhere is usually called "natural science". This seems to have led to a sort of inferiority complex among economists and other social "scientists", which they tried to overcome above all by mathematizing their disciplines. Economics has been certainly most successful in approaching this ideal. However, not only mathematics is required in order to become a true "science". What one needs, furthermore, according to aspiring real social scientists, is the hypothetical deductive method. The hypothetical deductive method is typical of natural science, but certainly not the only respectable method in town. It includes first of all constructing theoretical models, then giving testable hypotheses derived from such models, and, finally, empirical tests of the hypotheses against the reality of the social world.
I am certainly not criticizing the attempt of economics to model itself after physics, as long as two important restrictions are kept on record. Firstly, this methodological move is not necessary, although the social sciences, particularly in Anglophone countries, have almost completely adopted such modeling as the only respectable way of conducting functioning social science. Modeling economics after physics neglects, among other things, the fact that social sciences have successfully worked with models that were never tested empirically. 18 Furthermore, social sciences have even effectively worked without models, e.g. with analytical narratives.
Secondly, there is, moreover, a remarkable discrepancy between pretensions and reality. It has always been the aim of physics, and is, in fact, included in the hypothetical deductive model, to deliver "precise explanations and successful This seems to me a rather sobering result for pretensions to model economics after physics. It points to an overassessment of the mathematical structure and predictive power of economics. It might well be that the initial and boundary conditions of economical models and the changes over time of the latter are so complex that they cannot be effectively modeled to the desired degree, at least for the time being. It might well be that economics is more like meteorology, or "like 22 "Enfin, dans la crise, les modèles économiques et financiers disponibles -en particulier les modèles dynamiques stochstiques d'équilibre général -se sont avérés largement inopérants." ( TRICHET, J.-C., "Aujourd'hui: la théorie face à la crise", in BUSER, P., DEBRU, C. y MEYER, P. (eds.), Les Lumières: hier aujourd 'hui, demain. Science et societè -Die Aufklärung: gestern, heute, morgen. Wissenschaft und Gesellschaft. Colloque interacadémique franco-allemand 7 et 8 février 2013 , à l'occasion du cinquantième anniversaire du Traité de l'Élysée, Hermann, Paris, 2013 . "I do not view economic models as an attempt to describe the world or to provide tools for predicting the future. I object to looking for an ultimate truth in economic theory, and I do not expect it to be the foundation for any policy recommendation. Nothing is >holy< in economic theory and everything is the creation of people like yourself.
[…] The word >model< sounds more scientific than >fable< or >fairy tale<, but I don't see much difference between them. […] . The fable is an imaginary situation that is somewhere between fantasy and reality. Any fable can be dismissed as being unrealistic or simplistic, but this is also the fable's advantage.
[…] a good model in economic theory, like a good fable, identifies a number of themes and elucidates them." 23 Whatever the exact methodological value of the comparison fairy tales/models may be, it seems to me important that students of economics be unequivocally informed that they are not studying physics.
Ad thesis 2) To this failure I would like to add another one: confounding abstract models with social reality, and at the same time not reflecting the value implications at the basis of those models. First of all, neoclassical economic models do not deal with real human beings. Their agent is the Homo oeconomicus, a creation of economists. 24 He is understood as a rational agent that acts exclusively in order to maximize his own utility. In this context human beings are interesting only as "consumers and firms. We assume that consumers seek to maximize utility and that firms seek to maximize economic profit, which is the difference between total revenue and total cost." 25 The most important instruments of homo oeconomicus in maximizing his utility are rational choice theory and game theory. Secondly, the most important boundary condition of the neoclassical approach is perhaps the so called Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), which states that agents on (financial) markets act completely rational on the basis of equal information. This is said to lead to a stable market equilibrium. Other boundary conditions include non-intervention from government and non regulation of markets with the exception of the regulation of money supply by the central banks. These boundary conditions are sometimes polemically called "market fundamentalism". This is the world, where Homo oeconomicus has come to life.
To be sure, using the model of Homo oeconomicus in the social sciences can create great insights, as long as one is clear about the fact that it is a methodological instrument of research and does not describe social reality in an encompassing and reliable way. Exactly this distinction between model and reality has come out of sight among many economists, 26 and Homo oeconomicus seems to have become reality in stock exchanges, banks, investment firms, and so on. But there is no doubt: "Homo oeconomicus is a sociopath", as the Cornell jurist Lynn A. Stout has succinctly put it. 27 In addition, Joseph Stiglitz ironically observes: "One interesting aspect of economics is that the model [of Homo oeconomicus] provides a better description of economists than it does of others, and the longer students study economics, the more like the model they become." 28 Bringing the Homo oeconomicus alive means selling abstract models as social reality. In other words, many mainstream neoclassical economists do not ask any more how humans are really wired. Rather, they claim that humans are wired just as their models assume, i.e. humans are beings that are constantly and permanently maximizing their own utility. Science -Focal Issues, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 2007, pp. 275-301. ethical problems that may result from the experimental application of neoclassical economy.
As an example I take the attempt of the "Chicago Boys" to turn upside down the economy of Chile. 32 The "Chicago Boys" were a strongly connected group, whose core consisted of some twenty Chilean economists, most of whom had studied economics with Milton Friedman and others at the University of Chicago. The "Boys" To cut a complex story short: the "Great Chile experiment" that put neoclassical economy to test, was, finally, a failure, and resulted in a collapse of the Chilean financial market in 1982. Sixteen of 50 private financial institutions went bankrupt with the usual consequences for real economy. To suffer were above all the poor.
We have seen that there are strict regulations in medicine for experiments on humans. The same does, unfortunately, not hold for economics. Ideology laden economists can do extreme social harm to people, when they are allowed to apply their theories in grand experiments as happened in the case of Chile. Protected by a dictator of a third world country they could just go ahead as their American ideological agenda suggested. If there had been democratic control, such experiments would hardly have been possible. 32 There is an excellent article "Chicago Boys" in the German Wikipedia (seen March 2014).
